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The aim of this article is to articulate and critically discuss different answers to the 
following question: How should decision-makers deal with conflicts that arise when 
the values usually entailed in ethical guidelines – such as accuracy, privacy, non-
discrimination and transparency – for the use of Artificial Intelligence (e.g. 
algorithm-based sentencing) clash with one another? To begin with, I focus on 
clarifying some of the general advantages of using such guidelines in an ethical 
analysis of the use of AI. Some disadvantages will also be presented and critically 
discussed. Second, I will show that we need to distinguish between three kinds of 
conflict that can exist for ethical guidelines used in the moral assessment of AI. This 
section will be followed by a critical discussion of different answers to the question of 
how to handle what we shall call internal and external values conflicts. Finally, I will 
wrap up with a critical discussion of three different strategies to resolve what is called 
a ‘genuine value conflict’. These strategies are: the ‘accepting the existence of 
irresolvable conflict’ view, the ranking view, and value monism. This article defends 
the ‘accepting the existence of irresolvable conflict’ view. It also argues that even 
though the ranking view and value monism, from a merely theoretical (or 
philosophical) point of view, are better equipped to solve genuine value conflicts 
among values in ethical guidelines for artificial intelligence, this is not the case in 
real-life decision-making.  
 




In ethical discussions about the development and use of AI/machine learning, the 
industry (e.g. Google 2018), governments (e.g. European Commission 2020) and 
scholars (e.g. Bostrom and Yudkowsky 2014) argue that the development and use 
of these technologies ought to comply with certain ethical guidelines.1 Just to give 
an example of how AI is used, throughout this article I will refer to the use of 
algorithm-based sentencing, which is common in many American States (Cohen 
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2015, Demulder and Gubbi 1983 and Freeman 2016). Algorithm-based sentencing 
(ABS) is an AI tool that is used to support a judge’s decision when the judge needs 
to predict the risk of recidivism for an offender in the sentencing process. The 
algorithm behind ABS is fed information such as the offender’s age, criminal 
record, sex, job status, religion, income, housing, family status and ethnicity. The 
algorithm is also fed a certain value for each of these bits of information in relation 
to the prediction of recidivism.  
However, the authors of ethical guidelines for the use of an AI tool such as ABS 
do not always clarify what it means to comply with these ethical guidelines. In what 
follows, I adhere to the interpretation that in order to comply with such guidelines, 
the development and use of a certain application of AI – for example ABS2 – should 
ideally not violate certain moral principles or values3 entailed in these guidelines. 
We are here talking about values such as accountability, accuracy, prevention of 
harm, fairness, non-discrimination, respect for privacy, and transparency, which 
are all values that have a place in most ethical guidelines for the use of AI (see also 
Morley et al. 2019 for an overview of ethical guidelines for AI/machine learning 
technology).  
Not only has important and detailed scholarly work been done to clarify the 
meaning of several of these values in connection with both the general use of 
algorithm-supported decision-making and, more specifically, the use of ABS. 
Ethical analysis of whether a specific use of ABS violates a specific value usually also 
follows from the conceptual clarification of each value. Herewith are some 
examples of elaborations concerning whether or when the use of ABS, or algorithm-
supported decision-making in general, is, from a moral point of view, accountable 
(see e.g. Fink 2018 and Binns 2018a), sufficiently accurate (see e.g. Washington 
2018 and Ryberg 2020), fair (see e.g. Friedler et al. 2016, Feller et al. 2016 and Binns 
2018b), and transparent (see e.g. Carlson 2017).  
Besides this detailed and highly clarifying analysis of each value, which is often 
undertaken with no detailed considerations or comparison of other values, little 
work has been done to clarify when a specific use of AI such as ABS has succeeded 
in following relevant ethical guidelines that typically involve several different values 
(such as those mentioned above). However, the latter type of clarification may seem 
redundant, as the obvious answer to the question of when ABS has been used in an 
ethically acceptable way is when its use has not violated any of the relevant values.  
However, as some scholars have pointed out, values such as the above-
mentioned may conflict with one another, in the sense that there are situations 
where we cannot comply with one value without violating another. Imagine, for 
example, that the supportive use of ABS by a judge, who needs to predict the risk 
of recidivism for an offender in the sentencing process, turns out to be more 
accurate than predictions made by judges who do not use ABS as a supporting tool 
for predictions of recidivism. Imagine also that, at the same time, it is clear that it 
is not transparent precisely which features (e.g. race, religion, income, housing and 
ethnicity) are fed into the algorithm and how these features in the algorithm are 
weighted in order to produce an outcome about the risk of recidivism of an 
offender. Imagine, furthermore, that the company or organization that has 
produced the algorithm wants to keep the features fed into the algorithm a trade 
secret in order to safeguard its profitability. Therefore, the company will not spend 
time developing and selling their more accurate algorithmic tool if transparency 




concerning all these features is required. Finally, no better alternative exists, 
meaning that access to a more transparent and equally accurate algorithm to 
predict future recidivism of offenders is not available. In such a case – let us call it 
the accuracy vs transparency case – accuracy and transparency are in conflict, in the 
sense that you cannot comply with one without violating the other.  
The aim of this article is to articulate and critically discuss different answers to 
the following question, raised by cases like those mentioned above. How shall we 
deal with these kinds of conflicts if values entailed in ethical guidelines for the use 
of AI often do or can conflict with one another or with other important values (that 
may not be part of the ethical guidelines in question), and yet we also want ethical 
guidelines to guide us when morally evaluating the use of AI tools?   
This article is relevant for several reasons. First, there is no doubt that trying to 
understand and discuss how we should handle conflicts between different values – 
each of which should ideally not be violated – that are involved in the use of 
algorithm-based decision-making, like ABS, is of clear professional and academic 
interest.4 This is especially so because few scholars working within the ethics of AI 
seem to recognize the problem of conflict between these values5 or to have 
addressed it in any detail. Second, ethical analysis of, for example, the 
implementation or increased use of ABS to improve decision-making in the 
sentencing process should also be of interest to politicians, judges, victims, 
offenders, relatives of victims and offenders, and the general public, because as 
politicians and judges, they have to decide whether the criminal justice system 
should use ABS, or whether it would be morally acceptable but not obligatory to 
use ABS. Third, the consequences of using AI, such as ABS, will affect not only the 
sentencing process but also the outcome of the sentencing process. Both the process 
of sentencing and its outcome will usually have a huge impact on the well-being of 
those whose lives are most directly affected by the use of ABS – notably, offenders, 
victims, and the relatives of both. Finally, while it is necessary to clarify each value 
– such as accuracy, non-discrimination, transparency and privacy – and to 
investigate when the application of AI complies with each of these values, these 
types of investigations are not sufficient to determine whether the use of a certain 
kind of AI, such as ABS, is morally acceptable. Moreover, as already hinted, these 
kinds of investigations are not sufficient to decide, from a moral point of view, 
when we should accept a specific use of AI, as conflicts between values within 
ethical guidelines can often arise.  
How should decision-makers (e.g. politicians and judges who are going to 
decide whether or how to implement ABS in criminal courts) deal with value 
conflicts that may arise from the ethical guidelines concerning the morally 
acceptable use of AI? In order to prepare the ground for answering this question, I 
will proceed as follows. In the first section, I want to justify why it is worth spending 
the time to discuss ethical guidelines. More precisely, I shall try to clarify some of 
the general advantages of implementing such guidelines in an ethical analysis of the 
use of ABS. Some disadvantages will also be presented and critically discussed. The 
purpose of the section to follow is to show that we need to distinguish between three 
kinds of conflict that can exist for ethical guidelines used in the moral assessment 
of AI such as ABS. Finally, I will distinguish between and critically discuss three 
different strategies when faced with what I call genuine value conflicts. The 
strategies are: the ‘accepting the existence of irresolvable conflict’ view, the ranking 




view, and value monism. This article defends the ‘accepting the existence of 
irresolvable conflict’ view. It also argues that, even though the ranking view and 
value monism, from a merely theoretical (or philosophical) point of view, are better 
equipped to resolve genuine value conflicts among values in ethical guidelines for 
AI, this is not the case in real-life decision-making.  
 
 
On some advantages and disadvantages of using ethical guidelines  
Ethical guidelines for the use of AI, such as ABS, which incorporate moral values 
such as accountability, accuracy, non-discrimination and transparency offer several 
advantages. In the following discussion, I will focus on two of them: a) identifying 
what values to comply with when it comes to the use of ABS (e.g. via a checklist) 
and b) providing material for critical moral reasoning concerning the use of ABS. 
One of the first steps in a thoughtful moral evaluation of the use of AI, such as 
ABS, is to be clear about which values political decision-makers, AI-ethicists, 
companies and the general public believe are important to take into account in 
order to estimate the moral status of a certain use of AI. Values expressed in ethical 
guidelines concerning the use of ABS can thus direct our attention towards the 
relevant values. Indeed, few scholars or politicians would say that we should not 
care about values like accountability, accuracy, non-discrimination and 
transparency. Instead, some researchers have stated: ‘This list of criteria [in ethical 
guidelines for the use of AI/machine learning] … serves as a small sample of what 
an increasingly computerized society should be thinking about’ (Bostrom and 
Yudkowsky 2014). However, the mere existence and knowledge of these values in 
itself does little to engender critical reasoning about the use of AI. This brings us to 
the next point. 
Second, by directing our attention to such guidelines, we can equip ourselves 
for the critical reasoning needed in the moral evaluation of a certain use of AI, such 
as ABS. Consulting the guidelines and trying to estimate to what extent a specific 
use of AI complies with them can make us stop and think and discuss whether this 
particular use is morally acceptable, morally unacceptable or morally obligatory. As 
Morley et al. (2019: 3) have argued, for example, such guidelines can be used as 
normative constraints for the dos and don’ts of algorithmic use in society. As an 
example of this, we can refer to the software company Northpoint (now Equivant), 
which has created an algorithm called COMPAS. COMPAS is used nationwide in 
the USA to decide ‘whether defendants awaiting trial are too dangerous to be 
released on bail’ (Feller et al. 2016: 1). Northpoint refused to disclose the details of 
its proprietary algorithm, although it is claimed that the algorithm used is biased 
against African Americans. It is understandable that Northpoint refused full 
disclosure of the algorithm as it is a trade secret, and the company needs to protect 
its bottom line. However, this case at least raises ethical questions about relying on 
for-profit companies to develop risk assessment tools, if the use of ABS violates the 
value of transparency. Therefore, the move from identifying important values to 
critical moral discussion is important if we want to harvest the possible benefits of 
ABS and minimize the possibility of initiating ‘ethical scandals’ in the wake of ABS 
use. 
However, before we discuss so-called conflict problems in the following 
sections, we can challenge the existence and use of ethical guidelines in some 




obvious ways. First, there is the challenge that the mere existence of such guidelines 
would lead to ethics shopping or alternatively to ethical whitewashing.  Roughly 
speaking, ethics shopping can be specified as the practice of choosing certain ethical 
principles from a variety of such principles in order to justify one’s behaviour a 
posteriori, ‘instead of implementing or improving new behaviours by 
benchmarking them against public, ethical standards [e.g. ethical guidelines 
concerning AI]’ (Floridi 2019: 186). Ethical whitewashing (or ethical window 
dressing) can be defined as the practice of making ‘misleading claims … or 
implementing superficial measures’ in order to defend one’s practice and thereby 
make it appear more ethical than it is in reality (Floridi 2019: 186).  
Although these are serious challenges, I will not deal with these and related 
issues in any detail since several scholars within numerous fields, such as computer 
ethics and  business ethics, have already tried to answer how we should handle the 
types of challenges which ethical guidelines are subject to (see e.g. Bowie 2017 and 
Floridi 2019). The solution concerning ethics shopping, according to Floridi, is to 
establish a shared, clear, authoritative and publicly accepted standard of what 
counts as morally good AI (Floridi 2019: 187). A big improvement is this direction 
is the European Commission’s Ethics Guidelines for Trustworthy AI, with which 
anyone in the EU ideally ought to comply, according to the guidelines (European 
Commission 2020).6 The solution to ethical whitewashing, according to Floridi 
(2019) and others, is transparency and education. Transparency clarifies whether 
the development and use of, for example, ABS do not violate values such as 
accuracy, accountability, non-discrimination and respect for privacy. A further 
strategy for minimizing ethical whitewashing is educating the public and politicians 
and having established professional ethical boards to deal with values and whether 
the values in the guidelines are actually implemented in the development and use 
of AI tools such as ABS. However, even if ethical guidelines do not lead to ethics 
shopping and do not function merely as window-dressing, problems remain for the 
implementation of ethical guidelines.  
Apart from the above-mentioned criticism, the traditional philosophical 
criticism of ethical guidelines is based on the premise that the values mentioned in 
such guidelines are described in very vague terms, and furthermore, can be in 
conflict with one another. Moreover, insofar as this is true, such guidelines may 
therefore not provide much support for us when it comes to guiding our actions. If 
it turns out that guidelines cannot guide us, they are not of much use in the ethical 
evaluation of AI such as ABS. In the next section, I will briefly elaborate on the 
problem of vagueness of concepts and conflict between values. This work is 
important in order to set the stage for the final section, in which a critical discussion 
of several answers and solutions to the challenges of value conflicts will be the 
subject of inquiry. 
 
 
The challenges of conflicting values  
Next, I suggest that we differentiate between three kinds of possible conflicts 
between values when we want to apply ethical guidelines in the ethical evaluation 
of the use of an AI tool such as ABS. These three kinds of conflicts I call conceptual 
conflicts, internal conflicts and external conflicts. Let me present them and provide 




examples, and then make clear why we will primarily discuss different kinds of 
answers for resolving the latter two kinds of conflicts.  
A conceptual conflict arises within one single value and involves different 
interpretations of the single value in question. As an example, take the value ‘non-
discrimination’. If we want to know whether the data provided by an ABS are 
discriminatory or whether the use of these data is discriminatory, we need to know 
what we mean by the term ‘discrimination’.7 However, as Kasper Lippert-
Rasmussen (2013) and others (e.g. Binns 2018b) have made clear, we can 
distinguish between different forms of discrimination. An important distinction in 
specifying the term ‘discrimination’ is the distinction between direct and indirect 
discrimination. One way to clarify what is meant by direct discrimination is to 
underline that it involves some kind of negative mental state or attitude – for 
example hate, hostility, stereotyping or neglect – towards the object of 
discrimination – let’s say, African Americans. However, even though the 
development and use of ABS do not involve direct discrimination of African 
Americans, they may involve indirect discrimination of them. This observation has 
been a cornerstone of the critique of the Northpoint company that created the 
algorithm of the recidivism predicting tool COMPAS. For even if we assume 
COMPAS was produced with no negative mental states about African Americans 
(which I cannot confirm) and did not enter race as a feature in the algorithm (which 
is true), the output of the algorithm has been claimed to be biased against African 
Americans through indirect discrimination (Feller et al. 2016). This is because some 
of the other features fed into the COMPAS algorithm, such as low income, housing 
in high crime areas, unemployment and criminal records, result in more African 
Americans than European Americans being predicted to reoffend.  
In the philosophical literature, we can find several examples of how different 
interpretations of the same value entailed in ethical guidelines can lead to conflicts 
in estimating whether an algorithm is transparent or not (Ryberg 2020 and Ryberg 
and Petersen 2021) or fair or not (Binns 2018b). The existence of these types of 
conflicts makes it difficult to know whether an algorithm is sufficiently transparent 
or non-discriminatory, for instance, or to compare whether one proposal for non-
discriminatory algorithms is better than other proposals.  
One obvious solution to this conceptual conflict is to try to specify what 
understanding of ‘discrimination’, ‘transparency’ or other value one wishes not to 
violate in the development and use of ABS. Although specifying our understanding 
might appear to be an obvious solution, this is not necessarily so. This is both 
because each value can be interpreted differently and because, from an epistemic 
point of view, it may be difficult to know whether a producer or a user of ABS is 
discriminating directly against a particular group of people, since it can be difficult 
to access the mental states of a person. However, by specifying a value like non-
discrimination, we at least know where to look in order to determine if an algorithm 
or its use complies with a value such as non-discrimination or not. 
The two other kinds of conflict – internal and external – are less discussed in 
the literature concerning ethical evaluations of AI and uses of it, such as ABS. 
Unique to these two kinds of conflict is that they arise not within one value, but 
between different kinds of values. For example, imagine a case where an algorithm 
supporting judges in predicting the recidivism of an offender in order to measure 
out the appropriate sentence is clearly constructed in a way where both the 




construction of the algorithm and its application are both directly and indirectly 
discriminatory against women. In such a case, the value of transparency is satisfied, 
but the value of non-discrimination is not. Compare this with a case where it is not 
fully transparent how an algorithm for ABS has been constructed, but where the 
outcome of sentencing is less racist and sexist compared to decisions made by 
judges who are not supported by ABS. In such a case, at least the value of indirect 
non-discrimination may be satisfied but the value of transparency is not. We 
therefore need to know what to do in a conflict between values or at least clarify 
that a conflict exists, and decide whether it makes sense to say that a specific use of 
ABS complies successfully with the values embedded in the relevant ethical 
guidelines when we cannot have it all, so to speak. Parallel kinds of conflicts can 
occur if some of the values listed in the ethical guidelines clash with other values 
that are not listed there. A possible scenario might be if the value of privacy or 
transparency is satisfied in the development and use of ABS, but the outcome 
results in terrible consequences for the well-being of potential victims, and the value 
‘increasing well-being for the victim’ is not part of the guidelines.8 A certain use of 
ABS that would respect privacy, transparency and non-discrimination, for instance, 
might offer bail to many offenders, with the consequence that there could be many 
more victims of crimes than if more offenders were denied bail.  
Therefore, if we accept that both internal and external conflicts of values do 
exist, it is of practical importance to know how we should deal with this if we want 
to apply ethical guidelines in the moral evaluation of AI decision tools such as ABS. 
One could argue here that if there is a conflict between certain values in the 
application of AI, then it should not be used. But the problem with this kind of 
reasoning is that if we do not allow conflict between the values in ethical guidelines 
for AI, then we should probably never use AI at all. Few would accept this decision 
since AI can be of tremendous help in solving or making us better equipped to 
handle big data and important social challenges in modern society.9 
 
 
Strategies for dealing with value conflicts  
So what are we to do when the values used to guide the use of AI come into conflict? 
This question can be interpreted as a more concrete version of a traditional and 
general question within normative ethics that arises for all ethical theories that 
accommodate the existence of more than one intrinsic value. In addition, I shall 
therefore draw from some of this literature on the subject to answer our more 
concrete question. I will present and critically discuss different kinds of strategies 
that we can call the ‘accepting the existence of irresolvable conflicts’ view, the ranking 
view and value monism. 
However, before we move on to the investigation of these three strategies, we 
need to keep in mind that when we talk about conflicts between values, we are 
referring to what we could call genuine conflicts rather than superficial conflicts 
between values. Genuine conflicts between values are those that, unlike superficial 
conflicts, cannot be resolved by a deeper understanding or specification of the 
values in question. One example of a genuine conflict between values might be the 
conflict between accuracy and transparency mentioned in the introduction. A 
conflict of values leads us to perform incompatible actions: each value obligates us 
to do something we can do, but we cannot fulfil both values; that is, if we fulfil one, 




we cannot fulfil the other.10 On the other hand, a superficial conflict is an alleged 
conflict between values that evaporates when we specify the contents of the values 
in question. An example of how a conflict between values could be a superficial 
conflict is the case mentioned in the introduction involving accuracy versus 
transparency. In this case, we could argue that no conflict between accuracy and 
transparency exists, because we believe that satisfying the value of transparency 
does not mean that all the features fed into the algorithm by the (Northpoint) 
company ought to be transparent to everyone.11 When superficial conflicts between 
relevant values are thus resolved we can say that this kind of use successfully 
complies with the ethical guidelines in question.  
Therefore, if the conflict does not evaporate in attempting to specify or interpret 
the value in question, we have a genuine conflict. However, given this distinction 
between superficial and genuine conflicts, how can and should we handle a genuine 
conflict between values? I present and discuss three different strategies to address 
this question.  
 The first strategy is simply to explicitly accept that such conflicts may be 
irresolvable and that successful compliance with ethical guidelines for a specific use 
of AI may involve such value conflicts. Keeping the above-mentioned accuracy 
versus transparency case in mind – it is not morally better (or worse) to choose an 
algorithm that is more accurate but less transparent than it is to choose an 
algorithm that is more transparent but less accurate, given the available alternatives. 
This kind of reasoning is reflected in the work of bioethicists Tom L. Beauchamp 
and James F. Childress, who formulate their view as follows: ‘[value] conflicts 
sometimes produce irresolvable moral dilemmas. When forced to a choice, we may 
“resolve” the situation by choosing one option over another, but we may still believe 
that neither option is morally preferable’ (Beauchamp and Childress 2013: 12). 
Another example of a philosopher who accepts that moral conflicts can be 
irresolvable is Rosalind Hursthouse, who writes: ‘it is true both that a virtuous agent 
would do A, and that a virtuous agent would do B … both A and B are, in the 
circumstances, right’ (Hursthouse 2013: 650). In sum, irresolvable moral conflicts 
can arise in situations where none of the possible decisions are morally preferable 
(this is the position of Beauchamp and Childress) or when several different 
decisions may all be morally right (this is the view of Hursthouse). Apart from these 
differences, we should accept that both adhere to versions of the ‘accepting the 
existence of irresolvable conflicts’ view.12  
However, some obvious challenges to this view come to light.13 The first 
challenge is epistemic. How do we know which conflicts are irresolvable? What if 
one group of people says that, from a moral point of view, we should accept a 
certain use of AI because transparency carries greater weight than accuracy, and 
another group of people reaches the opposite moral conclusion? Is such a conflict 
between these two groups of people irresolvable or not? Defenders of the view that 
certain conflicts between values are irresolvable do not say much about how we can 
know or differentiate between irresolvable conflicts and moral conflicts that are 
resolvable. What Hursthouse does say, however, is that if we accept the existence of 
irresolvable moral conflict, this should not be taken as a counsel of despair or used 
as an excuse for moral laziness. Adding to this, Hursthouse writes that ‘[i]t will 
always be necessary to think very hard before accepting the idea that a particular 
moral decision does not have one right issue’ (Hursthouse 2013: 650). Again, this 




does not move us much further along in discovering whether we are confronted 
with an irresolvable conflict or not. What does it mean to think hard about a moral 
question? Although each of us has some idea of what it means to think hard about 
a moral question, we may still differ considerably over what that means. For 
instance, when we consider what kinds of facts are relevant, for example in the 
moral evaluation of ABS, such considerations could easily be a new point of 
disagreement about whether we have taken into account a suitable number of 
empirical considerations or research studies or whether we have explained central 
concepts in a satisfying way. In addition, when have we thought hard enough about 
a moral question? After one hour? Or after having studied 10 ethical papers or 
reports about different answers to the given question? It is difficult to say anything 
precise about this, but that may not be necessary. When it comes to the moral 
evaluation of whether or not we should use an AI, if the society we live in has ideally 
gone through a democratic deliberative process in which all the parties affected by 
the technology have been heard and all the values mentioned in the introduction 
have been discussed among scholars, in public as well as in parliament, this rough 
description should satisfy the notion of ‘thinking hard’.  
A second challenge, this one of a practical nature, is the following: if irresolvable 
conflicts between values have been detected, then what? We cannot just settle on 
the view that we agree there is a conflict when it comes to the ethical evaluation of 
AI, as some policy is needed. What course of action is most appropriate? Should we 
just toss a coin?14 Or should we consult a democratic process where the ethical view 
of scholars, politicians and those directly affected by the use of AI should guide our 
AI use? Will Kymlicka seems to accept the latter, when he reasons about the conflict 
between different moral values/principles in the context of assisted reproduction:  
Some potential conflicts between principles cannot be eliminated … In 
these circumstances, the Commissioners will have to balance the competing 
values as best they can, giving due weight to each. This is similar to the 
process of balancing values that judges are often confronted with. In both 
contexts we have a rough sense of when the process is being carried out 
impartially, and when someone is unduly biased towards particular 
interests. (Kymlicka 1993: 15) 
While this kind of answer starts to clarify what we should do, it raises at least one 
challenge given that there are irresolvable conflicts. This challenge is practical in 
nature, and involves the very process of handling these conflicts. What does 
Kymlicka mean by ‘balancing’ or ‘due weight’, for example? Although Kymlicka 
does make some effort to clarify these concepts, writing that we should ‘ensure … 
that all recommendations are checked against a comprehensive list of stakeholders 
and principles’ (Kymlicka 1993: 26). However, although this statement does make 
us a little wiser, some challenges remain. What does it mean to let decision-makers 
considering the use of, for example, AI ‘check’ a recommendation against values 
like transparency and accuracy? Is it enough to show that you have considered all 
relevant stakeholders and values, by arguing why and how a specific use of AI does 
not violate a value like transparency but does violate the value of accuracy, and that 
based on these considerations, you have decided to accept the specific use of AI in 
question? This could at least be one answer. What Kymlicka suggests is better than 
ethical reasoning that is not guided by ethical principles or guidelines, and it aligns 
strongly with some of the advantages of having ethical guidelines, as mentioned in 




the above-mentioned section. Dissatisfied with the ‘accepting the existence of 
irresolvable conflicts’ view, a common strategy for moral philosophers has been to 
defend strategies by which we can – at least in theory – resolve all or some value 
conflicts.15  
A first strategy in favour of the view that moral conflicts are resolvable is to 
insist on a hierarchy among the values to be applied in a given context. This is the 
ranking view. One possible way by which a hierarchy could resolve moral conflict 
between values would be to rank these values according to their moral importance. 
Such a ranking could be done in numerous ways: for example, as done by John 
Rawls (1999), who stated that the satisfaction of one set of basic rights or values 
(such as freedom of religion, freedom of speech, the right to property or the right 
to vote) may never be violated for the sake of some other values (such as those 
expressed by his principle of fair equality of opportunities or the difference 
principle). However, in the literature on the ethics of AI, I have not come across 
any detailed hierarchy for values such as accountability, accuracy, non-
discrimination and transparency described by any scholar or organization. The 
only hint of such a hierarchy I have been able to find is in the 2020 document by 
the European Commission which states that:  
AI is not an end in itself, but rather a promising means to increase human 
flourishing, thereby enhancing individual and societal well-being and the 
common good, as well as bringing progress and innovation. (European 
Commission 2020: 1)  
The European Commission makes clear that in order to achieve this end, we should 
ensure that the ethically acceptable use of AI is based on values such as 
accountability, accuracy, democracy, respect for privacy, transparency and safety. 
However, the quotation above suggests that a hierarchy of values consists of three 
important values (increase human flourishing, bring progress and innovation) that 
should trump all others. Accordingly, the statement suggests that it would be 
morally right to violate a value (or values) like transparency and privacy if it turns 
out that the violation of the value (or values) in question would increase human 
flourishing. This value of increasing human flourishing may look like utilitarianism 
in disguise, but this is not the case. Utilitarianism tells us to maximize well-being, 
not just to increase well-being. The following case illustrates the difference. Imagine 
that you can assist only one out of three people by a certain use of AI. If you assist 
A, you will, all else being equal, not increase A’s well-being. If you assist B, you will, 
all else being equal, increase B’s well-being by one unit of well-being. If you assist 
C, you will, all else being equal, increase C’s well-being by two units of well-being. 
In sum, you will increase well-being by assisting either B or C. However, you will 
maximize well-being only if you assist C. Another reason why this quotation by the 
European Commission on AI is not utilitarian is that it entails other values than 
increasing human flourishing, such as ‘bringing progress and innovation’. 
However, although this is an example of a hierarchy of values that can resolve 
conflicts between some values (e.g. conflicts between the three values mentioned in 
the quotation and the other values such as accuracy, transparency and privacy 
mentioned in the guidelines), this hierarchy cannot resolve all value conflicts. It 
cannot resolve conflicts between the three values (increase human flourishing, 
bringing progress and innovation) or between values such as those listed in the 
guidelines (e.g. accuracy, transparency and privacy). 




However, a third possible strategy to use when faced with conflicts between 
values is value monism in cases when the ‘accepting the irresolvable conflict’ view 
or the ranking view prove dissatisfactory. An example of a monism could be the 
value theory adopted by adherents of utilitarianism. If you are a utilitarian, moral 
conflicts can always be resolved, at least in theory. Simply choose the action – e.g. 
the use (or non-use) of AI – that maximizes well-being. Alternatively, if you do not 
know or are in doubt about what the consequences of AI use are, then choose the 
use of AI that we have good reason to expect will maximize well-being, even though 
it might violate one of the moral values such as transparency or privacy. If you apply 
this strategy, you will have succeeded in satisfying the ethical guidelines for AI. 
Monism, at least in theory, can solve conflicts between values (because 
according to monism there is only one value), but it can also be challenged. First, 
one could argue that monistic theories such as utilitarianism themselves give rise 
to value conflicts, since there exists a degree of pluralism about what well-being is 
and how to measure well-being. The sheer number of different versions of theories 
of well-being, for example – ranging from hedonistic and desire-based theories to 
objective-list-theories – clearly indicates a conflict between different under-
standings of well-being. However, although this kind of conflict about how to 
specify the value of well-being only amounts to a conceptual conflict and not a 
moral conflict between the value of well-being and other values such as 
transparency, it still poses a potential conflict for decision-makers.16  
Second, a further challenge to monism is that is does not (contrary to having a 
plurality of values) allow for the complexity and moral conflict of our moral 
experiences. Some philosophers (e.g. Beauchamp and Childress 2013) claim that it 
is an advantage that a pluralism of values reflects our moral reality. In addition, 
several empirical studies support the idea that people universally often adhere to 
several different values (see e.g. Haidt 2012) instead of just one. If this is true, and 
the universal public only takes seriously ethical guidelines that entail the values that 
the public adheres to, it is important that there not be too big a distance between 
public opinion and ethical guidelines. However, some challenges arise for this kind 
of criticism. First, although our current moral framework may be a good place to 
begin, history has often shown us that our morality has been wrong in several cases 
when we try to justify how we ought to act. Slavery and the sexual harassment of 
women are two prime examples. Second, adhering to a monistic value, such as 
maximizing well-being or human flourishing, does not mean that we should throw 
out all other values. Other values such as respect for autonomy, privacy, 
transparency and non-discrimination can serve as important instrumental values 
for the realization of the ultimate aim – which could be to maximize well-being. 
The quoted recommendation by the European Commission can easily be read like 
this. If this were the strategy, there would not necessarily be any distance between 
a utilitarian decision-maker and the public’s adherence to several values in the 
evaluation of AI. This strategy works as a solution to the discrepancy between 
monism and people’s opinions on values, but it does not resolve the challenge of 
what decision-makers should do when values are in conflict. The problem of values 
conflict has simply been shifted from intrinsic values to instrumental values.    
A third challenge for monism is that monism, like utilitarianism, does not 
accept the existence of moral conflicts, as they can be solved in theory (e.g. by 
choosing the action that we can expect to maximize well-being). From a practical 




standpoint, however, grounds for substantial moral conflict will probably still exist. 
This could be either because adherents of utilitarianism disagree about whether or 
not public transparency of the algorithm will maximize well-being, or because some 
are deontologists who believe that we must never violate transparency or respect 
for privacy, even if such violations would maximize well-being.   
So, while value monism may look promising from a theoretical viewpoint, since 
it is simpler and more coherent than value pluralism, the acceptance of this view 
still involves many possible conflicts for decision-makers who have to deal with the 
ethics of AI in practice. Such conflicts are not only about issues that are conceptual 
(e.g. what do we mean by ‘well-being’ or ‘autonomy’) or empirical (e.g. will a 
particular use of AI, such as ABS, increase human well-being) but are also moral 
conflicts about what to do. However, it will not only be those moral conflicts that 
can arise if value monism accepts a plurality of values as instrumental, but what we 
morally believe to be right or wrong also depends on conceptual and empirical 
issues which may also cause conflict about what we ought to do.  
When the ranking view and value monism do not seem to offer us much 
guidance in conflicts between values (since both approaches involve value conflicts 
and other inherent conflicts) in ethical guidelines, we are left with settling on 
‘accepting the irresolvable conflict’ view. Although this view also faces some 
practical problems, it at least accepts that value conflicts need not be explained away 





I hope to have shown that despite some advantages to using ethical guidelines in 
the moral evaluation of AI, such as ABS, one important and often overlooked 
challenge is the conflict that can arise between the values embedded in the relevant 
ethical guidelines. In dealing with this challenge we should first of all be clear about 
the kind of challenge we are referring to in order to be able to handle the conflict. 
Is it a conceptual challenge, or an internal conflict among the values expressed in 
the ethical guidelines, or an external conflict between values written into the 
guidelines and values that are not written into the guidelines? Is the conflict 
superficial or genuine? If we are confronted with a genuine conflict, we can use 
different strategies. First, we saw that the ‘accepting the existence of irresolvable 
conflicts’ view faces both epistemic and practical problems that could be reasonable 
resolved. Second, the ranking view, although a possibility for solving moral 
conflicts between values represented in guidelines for AI, has not been worked out 
by any scholars or governments in any detail. Even one of the best known examples 
of a ranking view developed by Rawls in his political philosophy clearly implies 
conflicts of values, too. Third, we discussed value monism as a strategy that, as least 
from a purely theoretical point of view, could resolve value conflict. However, 
analysing the workings of value monism revealed that the approach entails different 
kinds of conflicts that we could not expect to be resolved by those making decisions 
on the use of AI. From these discussions ‘accepting the existence of irresolvable 
conflict’ view appears to be the most realistic and the least problematic strategy for 
real life decision-making. 
 





1 According to Floridi (2019), more than 70 recommendations/guidelines about the 
ethics of AI have been published within the last couple of years (2017–2018). 
2 Instead of writing ‘the development and use of AI’ in what follows, for stylistic 
reasons I will mostly just write ‘the use of AI’. This is not to neglect the point that 
ethical reasoning based on ethical values exists at each stage of the algorithmic 
pipeline. Moreover, this holds true for case development, design, building and 
testing through to use/deployment and monitoring. For a diagram of these different 
stages, see e.g. Morley et al. 2019. 
3 ‘Moral values’ is used here as a synonym for ‘moral factors’. A moral factor 
determines the moral status of an act. So the overall moral status of an act, if it 
involves different values, depends on the interplay/weighting between different 
kinds of values or factors. For this kind of specification, see Kagan (1998: 17–18) – 
although Kagan only uses the term ‘moral factors’. Moral values or moral factors 
concerning the moral evaluation of the use of AI can easily be translated into moral 
principles. Take privacy as an example: ‘… the AI system’s impact on privacy and 
data protection, which are fundamental rights … which covers the respect for a 
person’s mental and physical integrity’ (European Commission 2020: 12).   
4 The problem of value conflicts is of course a general problem that confronts 
anyone who use ethical guidelines, whether it be within professions such as 
architecture, psychology, engineering or private companies.   
5 See e.g. Mittelstadt et al. 2016 who, when considering points of future research for 
algorithmic ethics, only focuses on the development of single concepts such as 
accountability, transparency, autonomy and privacy. The issue of how to handle 
conflicts between these values is not even mentioned.  
6 A further step towards harmonization and therefore against ethics shopping is 
also found in Section 2.4 of the Ethics Guidelines for Trustworthy AI 2019 
(European Commission 2019), where it is mentioned that the EU wants to work in 
favour of building an international  consensus on the ethics of AI. 
7 ‘Discrimination’ is conceived of here as a morally problematic factor, as this fits 
in well with the idea that non-discrimination is a value that should not be violated 
according to the ethical guidelines for the development and use of AI. 
8 The case mentioned here is constructed purely to illustrate a logical possibility. 
Usually, guidelines for AI do include the ‘no-harm’ principle or that ‘the ultimate 
aim is to increase human well-being’ (European Commission 2019: 1).  
9 I will only focus on examples of internal conflicts, as these are easily noticed in the 
scholarly and public debate on the use of AI. External conflicts can easily be 
translated into internal conflicts when those who have worked out the guidelines 
can accept that a value that is not presented in their guidelines should in fact be 
incorporated into them. At least, this is my own experience after working on several 
ethical councils for the state or for private companies.   
10 See e.g. Tännsjö (2011) for a specification of a value conflict close to my 
description. 
11 This way of reasoning about a possible solution to an alleged conflict between 
different moral values is inspired by Hursthouse (2013).  
12 A view similar to the ‘accepting the existence of irresolvable conflicts’ view is also 
presented and argued for by e.g. Williams (1981) and Stocker (1990 and 1997). 




13 See e.g. Mason (2018) for a splendid overview of arguments both for and against 
value monism as well as value pluralism.  
14 Hursthouse (2013: 652) writes explicitly that tossing a coin is not the morally 
appropriate way to solve a moral conflict – ‘would the virtuous agent toss a coin? 
Of course not.’ By why should a virtuous person not want to toss a coin? At least 
we can imagine situations where it would be the right thing to do – even for a 
virtuous person. If we are in need of a choice and if both choices are morally right 
– then it should not matter which one we choose. Moreover, there may be situations 
where it may be far more important that we make a choice than how we make it. 
Even though one finds it morally problematic to toss a coin in order to solve a moral 
problem, it may be morally more problematic to delay making a choice or to not 
make a choice at all. A virtuous agent should, for example, not delay making a 
choice between alternative X or Y if both alternatives, all else being equal, would 
promote well-being to the same extent, but for different groups of otherwise 
identical individuals.  
15 One obvious answer for how one can resolve moral conflicts, at least in theory, is 
to adhere to what is called metaethical cognitivism, according to which moral views 
and moral principles/theories can be true or false; see Parfit (2011) for the view that 
cognitivism can solve moral conflicts and Rowland (2021) for a critical discussion 
of this view. So if we have an alleged moral conflict between two people, with one 
person arguing for ABS use and the other against ABS use, it can always be resolved 
by appealing to the true morality of the matter in question. However, to discuss in 
any depth whether cognitivism is plausible or not would take far more space than 
we can allow in an article on how to deal with value conflicts within ethical 
guidelines for AI. Furthermore, even if cognitivism were true and could in theory 
solve moral conflicts based on value conflicts, that would not eliminate the 
existence of value conflicts in practice. Cognitivism would not be able to solve value 
conflicts between people having to make decisions. The reason for this is that not 
everyone would know about or accept cognitivism as true and/or because people 
would still disagree about which values are the right ones. Further reasons for why 
resolving value conflicts between people having to make decisions include differing 
opinions on how we should understand these values, for example, whether each 
value should carry the same moral weight, and what answers about moral issues we 
can or ought to derive from these values.   
16 A moral conflict among utilitarians about whether conduct C is right can of 
course also arise from differences in opinion about what the currency of ‘utility’ is, 
and what the expected consequences of the utility of C is estimated to be.  The same 
types of problems can arise with monistic versions by deontologists who believe 
that a certain kind of conduct should not be violated (e.g. not harming or risking 
harm to innocent humans), because people have conflicting opinions about what 
counts as harm and what counts as a morally problematic risk of harm to others. 
17 For a further discussion of how to deal with such conflicts through compromise, 
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